For their part, the Allies were prepared to respect the wish of the Greek Government to keep out of the War, and would not allow the Venizelist faction to invade or extend control over any of the territory still under the rule of the Royalist Government. We would also raise the blockade as soon as our demands had been satisfactorily carried out.

This ultimatum proved to be efficacious for its purpose. I may anticipate the sequel to the Rome Conference as far as Salonika was concerned, to say that although the Greek Government showed an obvious desire to evade fulfilment of the terms of the Allied ultimatum, it found itself compelled to proceed with their observance. By the end of January, Brigadier-General Philipps was able to report to us that while the Greek troops would not all be south of the Isthmus by the appointed day, enough would have gone to render the remnant harmless against us; and the position was by then so satisfactory that we were able to sanction a partial relaxation of the blockade.

Value of the Conference

The Rome Conference came to subsidiary decisions which had in the sequel important results. It temporarily cleared up the Greek situation. Both at Athens and Salonika it saved us from precipitate action which would have damaged the Allied cause. It initiated transport arrangements for the use of

Italian railways to carry troops and material from France to Brindisi. These arrangements relieved the pressure on our shipping, and what is more important, they ultimately enabled French and British troops to rush to the aid of the broken army of Italy after Caporetto without loss of invaluable time.

Perhaps one of the most far-reaching decisions of